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Abstract 
 
Developed as a supranational corporate form intended to facilitate cross-border activity by natural 
and legal persons alike, the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) arguably offers 
multinational enterprises looking to collaborate with other entities an efficient and effective corporate 
vehicle for their projects.  
 
Though this form offers multinational enterprises many attractive features, certain drawbacks 
associated with this form may impede take-up by such entities. After a review of the development of the 
EEIG (part I), this paper will examine the features and purposes of this corporate form (part II), 
before looking at the benefits (part III) and the drawbacks associated with this form (part IV). In the 
conclusion, the author will review possible reforms to this corporate form. 
 
Introduction 
 
Whilst the European Union (EU) has introduced the notion of mutual recognition to guarantee the 
unfettered movement of goods, the law governing business organisations by its nature renders the 
concept of mutual recognition difficult to apply in practice since it is national law that determines 
whether an entity has legal personality.1 2 3 4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
♦ LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M., Dip. Legal Practice, Solicitor (England and Wales) (qualified 1st April 1999). Law Lecturer (Law 
School, Université Jean Moulin, France). Visiting professor of law (Law School, Université Aix Marseille, France; 
AlterEurope, Université Jean Monnet St Etienne, France). Founder of the LL.M. and Postgraduate Diploma in international 
and European Law (Law School, Université Jean Moulin, France). Former Academic Director of the LL.M. and Postgraduate 
Diploma in International and European Law (Law School, Université Jean Moulin, France). Email address 
michala.meiselles@gmail.com. 
1 Selected articles reviewing the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) include Mark Abell and Robert Blin, EC 
Economic Interest Groupings come to life, 8 Int’l Fin L Rev 9 (1989); Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate 
Law in the European Union, 31 Cornell Int’l LJ 377 (1998); Johan de Bruycker, EC Company Law – The European 
Company versus The European Economic Interest Grouping and the Harmonization of the National Company Laws, 21 Ga J 
Int'l & Comp L 19 (1991); Dominique Carreau and William L. Lee, Towards A European Company Law, 9 Nw J Int'l L & 
Bus 501 (1988- 1989); Cynthia Chessick, 1992: The Integration of the European Common Market,  2 DePaul Bus LJ 149 
(1989-1990); Brian R. Chiffen, Establishing Business Operations in the European Economic Area: Key Company Law 
Principles, 17 Int'l Legal Prac 102 (1992); Alfred Conrad, European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws, 89 Mich 
L Rev 2150 (1990-1991); Janet Dine, The European Community's Company Law Directives - Changing the Balance of 
Power?, 1 KCLJ 41 (1990-1991); David Donald, Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational 
Incorporation, 9 Dick J Int'l L 1 (1991); Eric Engle, The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and 
Opportunities in the New Europe, 4 DePaul Bus & Comm LJ 351 (2005-2006); Richard English, Company Law in the 
European Single Market, 1990 BYU L Rev 1413 (1990); Piet Everaert, An EEIG: When and where is it a permanent 
establishment?,1 Int'l Tax Rev 27 (1989-1990); Lisbeth Grodum, Denmark's EEIG gets general partnership treatment, 2 Int'l 
Tax Rev 34 (1990-1991); and Daniel T. Murphy, The European Economic Interest Group (EEIG): A New European Business 
Entity, 23 Vand J Transnat’l L 66 (1990-1991). The EEIG is reviewed in the following official report produced by the United 
States International Trade Commission, The Effects of Greater Economic Integration within the European Community on the 
United States - Third Follow-up Report (Washington: United States International Trade Commission, 1991). Available 
at  http://books.google.fr/books?id=5N2ZAAAAIAAJ&pg=SA1-PA22&lpg=SA1-
PA22&dq=EEIG+conference,+Brussels+1989&source=bl&ots=KFaUapvWXw&sig=cG3wkOG4n3UjkMbtkhBb2iWeG_c
&hl=en&sa=X&ei=rzr9UOXpEIqV0QXD2IGADQ&sqi=2&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false (last accessed 20 
August 2013) (1991 USITC Report). The EEIG is also reviewed in the following official publication produced by the 
European Commission, The EEIG: An instrument for transnational cooperation – A practical guide for SMEs (1998) (1998 
Commission Report on EEIG). 
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In a bid to find a workable solution to this difficulty, the Member States opted for the 
recognition of supranational corporate forms rather than needing to recognise the company law of each 
other. The resulting supranational corporate forms are not intended to replace national forms, instead 
being supplementary to these national forms, effectively create 'an independent and neutral stratum 
upon which businesses can move from one Member State to another in a cost-effective manner.’5 
 
Whilst earlier efforts by the EU were specificially targeted at the harmonisation process, the 
formulation of supranational corporate forms was and still is topic of confabulation not only at the 
institutional and national levels but also amongst academics and within business circles.  
 
This lengthy process of dialogue and compromise has culminated in the formulation of two 
prime supranational European-level corporate forms. The first is the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (the EEIG). The second, the SE (the European Company). Though both share certain 
similarities, they are substantively different.  
 
 
Part I 
 
Development of the EEIG as a Corporate Form 
 
The idea of a company with international capacity governed by international statute was pioneered in 
1897 by an Italian lawyer named Fedozzi. He believed that the creation of such a corporate form 
would effectively facilitate the creation of large enterprises suited to rapid development of industry.6  
 
The creation of a European corporate form straddling national boundaries was launched 
almost contemporaneously in 1959 in both France and the Netherlands by C. Thibierge (at the 57th 
Congress of French Notaries held at Tours) and Professor Pieter Sanders (in his inaugural speech 
given at Rotterdam School of Economics) respectively.7  
 
In December 1973, the European Commission (the Commission) submitted a proposal to the 
Council for a regulation for a structure permitting cooperation between entities in different Member 
States.8 The Commission believed that such a structure would permit cross-border collaboration 
amongst entities unhindered by national frontiers9 in turn addressing existing disparities between the 
bodies of substantive national law governing companies in the various Member States. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Official documents addressing the EEIG include: European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the Council on the 
European cooperation grouping (ECG), COM (73) 2046 (1973) (Proposal 1973); European Commission, Amended proposal 
for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the European cooperation grouping (ECG), COM (78) 139 final (1978); Council 
Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), OJ 1985 L199/1 (1985) 
(EEIG Regulation); Commission, Green Paper on Innovation, COM (95) 688 final (1995); Commission, The EEIG: An 
instrument for transnational cooperation – A practical guide for SMEs, 23-1998-00331-01-00-EN-TRA-00 (EN) (1998) 
(1998 Commission Report on EEIG). 
3 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 10. 
4 The historical background is based on official documents produced by the European Commission and posted on 
http://aei.pitt.edu (last accessed August 2011). The primary source used is an information note produced by the European 
Commission, European Joint-Stock Company, P-29/I (1970) http://aei.pitt.edu/31830/1/P_29_70.pdf (last accessed 27 
September 2013). 
5 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 10. 
6 De Bruycker, 'EC Company Law – The European Company versus The European Economic Interest Grouping and the 
Harmonization of the National Company Laws', 199 citing Konstandinidis, The Historical Evolution of the Concept of the 
European Company and Their Impact on Greek Law, 5-6 Hellenic Rev Int’l Rel 285 (1989). 
7 Paul M. Storm, A New Impulse towards a European Company, 26 Bus Law 1443, 1445 (1970-1971) citing the proposal put 
forth by the lawyer Claude Thibierge at the fifty seventh congress of the French Notaries held in Tours in 1959 [Claude 
Thibierge, Le statut des sociétés étrangères in Le statut de l’étranger et le marché commun (57th Congès des Notaires de 
France, Tours, 1959)] and for the proposal of Professor Pieter Sanders in his speech at the Rotterdam School of Economics 
on 22 October 1959 referred to in Pieter Sanders, Naar een Europese N.V.? (Amsterdam, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1959). 
8 Proposal 1973.  
9 Proposal 1973, Preamble. 
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contrarieties, the Commission argued, created a barrier to synergy amongst entities in different 
Member States notably undertakings established under the laws of the various Member States. 
 
Whilst prior to the adoption of the EEIG mechanisms existed in the national legal systems of 
the different Member States enabling entities there to establish connections between them through the 
taking of shares, contracts between management of the entities, mergers etc, these devices were not 
deemed sufficient suitable for cooperation at the Community level10 as recourse to national law was 
seen to be enough to deter such entities creating a dampening effect on cross-border cooperation and 
investment.11 According to the Commission:  
 
Recourse to a particular legal system is not always regarded as desirable in business circles, 
where ignorance of the laws of other Member States can give rise to apprehensions of which 
neither the reality nor the psychological importance can be doubted.12  
 
The EEIG form with its simple rules governing formation and operations was seen as a 
corporate form that would permit the removal of barriers to cooperation across frontiers13 allowing 
natural and legal persons to carry on their business activities in an enlarged market.14  
 
The conception of the EEIG was intended to fulfil a number of objectives aims. 
 
Firstly, in response to a concern expressed by European leaders that in order to realise the 
potential of the Community market (as it was at the time) companies needed to be able to operate on a 
Community-wide scale,15 the European legislature created the EEIG in a bid to permit companies of 
different Member States to form alliances in order to work together.16  
 
Secondly, the grouping was created in a bid to eliminate barriers within the Community in 
order to create more advantageous conditions for cross-border relations amongst undertakings.17 
 
Thirdly, in 1985 the creation of the EEIG was seen by the Commission as precursory to the 
launch of the SE. At the time 
 
The European Community was not yet ready… for the European Company; therefore the 
European Commission wanted to provide the European undertakings with a legal framework 
which would allow certain cross border transactions without creating a European 
corporation.18  
 
Fourthly, the EEIG was created as a test case for the European company. Acting as the first 
step on the road towards the creation of a truly European company. The reception that the EEIG 
received at the hands of companies and governments was seen by the Commission as indicative of 
how the European Company would fare if and when it was created.19  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Proposal 1973, Preamble. 
11 Proposal 1973, 17. 
12 Proposal 1973, 17. 
13 Proposal 1973, 17. 
14 Proposal 1973, Preamble. 
15 Conrad, 'European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws', 2164. 
16  Conrad, 'European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws', 2164. 
17  Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 11 citing from Proposal 1973, 
17. 
18 De Bruycker, 'EC Company Law – The European Company versus The European Economic Interest Grouping and the 
Harmonization of the National Company Laws', 196-197. 
19  1991 USITC Report, 1-22, citing the comments of an official of the Department of Trade and Industry, interview by 
USITC staff, London. 
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Enacted by the Council of Ministers on 25th July 1985 after more than a decade of discussion, 
the EEIG Regulation became applicable from 1st July 1989 in the Member States.20 
 
Part II - A Framework surrounding the Cooperation of Members 
 
I. Features 
 
The EEIG provides for a ʹ′somewhat original frameworkʹ′ enabling natural persons, companies, firms 
and entities governed by public or private law to collaborate across frontiers in order to conduct a 
portion of their economic activity jointly.21  
 
The grouping created under the EEIG Regulation is a legal instrument22 permitting persons - 
natural and legal alike - to cooperate whilst at the same time allowing them to retain their economic 
and legal independence. 23 As such the grouping ‘represents the framework surrounding the co-
operation of the members.’24  
 
This instrument of international co-operation rooted in EU law25 is intended to ‘make it easier 
for enterprises in the EU and the EEA to exercise certain activities on which a co-operation between 
them would be advantageous’26 by furnishing the means to ‘facilitate or develop the economic 
activities of its members and to improve or increase the results of those activities.’27  
 
Modelled on the French GIE (groupement a l’intéret économique) as an intermediate 
corporate form between a company and an association the EEIG28 is different from a company and a 
firm in a number of respects.29 
 
Firstly, the EEIG is an instrument for collaboration that neither replaces nor absorbs its 
constituent members.30  Rather than replacing its members the EEIG functions as a vehicle that allows 
these members to enhance their individual and collective performance. Secondly, at no point during its 
existence can the EEIG be used to absorb its constituent members. Each retains its legal and economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 EEIG Regulation, Art. 43.  
21 Mads Andenas and Frank Wooldridge, European Comparative Corporate Law 377 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
22 ‘The Regulation creates a legal framework in which natural persons, companies, firms and other legal entities can 
cooperate across frontiers, by means of a new legal instrument.’ (Case C-402/96 European Information Technology 
Observatory, Europäische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung [1997] ECR I-07515 (EITO case), para. 7).   
23  EEIG Regulation, Art. 3(1). 
24 Erik Werlauff,  EU - Company Law 119 (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2003). 
25 Carreau and Lee, 'Towards A European Company Law', 505. 
26 Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 118. 
27 EEIG Regulation, Art. 3(1). 
28 Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 116. The denominations in the various Member States include EESV (in Belgium), GIE (in 
France), EWIV (in Germany), GEIE (in Italy), AEIE (in Spain) and EEIG (in the UK). EESV stands for europees 
economisch samenwirkingsband. GIE stands for groupement d’intéret économique. EWIV stands for europäische 
wirtschaftliche interesseverenigung. GEIE stands for gruppo europeo di interesse economico. AEIE stands for agrupacion 
europea de interés economoci. Groupings are permitted and required to use one of the denominations noted (Werlauff, EU - 
Company Law, 117). Moreover, such groupings will also be required to comply with the provisions of national law on 
company and business names (Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 117). In this context it is worthwhile giving due consideration 
to the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the EITO case which establishes that national law applicable to a 
grouping may impose more extensive requirements than those following from EEIG Regulation, Art. 5(a), which states that 
the designation European Economic Interest Grouping or the abbreviation EEIG must be included within the registered name 
of the grouping. (Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 117) In the EITO case, the ECJ states that ‘[t]he Regulation thus provides 
that the business name of an EEIG must include the words 'European Economic Interest Grouping' or the initials 'EEIG', but 
is silent as to the content of the name. It follows that requirements in that connection may, in accordance with Article 2(1) of 
the Regulation, be imposed by the provisions of internal law applicable in the Member State in which the grouping has its 
official address.’ (EITO case, para. 22) 
29 Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 116. 
30 De Bruycker, 'EC Company Law – The European Company versus The European Economic Interest Grouping and the 
Harmonization of the National Company Laws', 197-198. 
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independence throughout the life of the EEIG. Thirdly, though the EEIG is able to generate profits, the 
EEIG is not intended to be used as a profit-making entity in its own right.31  
 
The Regulation governing EEIGs allows entities to create something that resembles, at the 
same time, both a partnership32 and a joint venture.33 According to Professor Donald the 'closest 
American parallel to the EEIG would be a partnership form that allowed - or even required - the 
partners to reside in different states.’34 The EEIG is analogous to the partnership form under US law, 
since the EEIG which represents ‘the formalisation of a network or collaborative project’35 between 
entities is 'more of a network of individual persons and firms than an entity in itself.’36  
 
Professor Engle likens the EEIG to 'an institutional form for joint venture partnerships 
between two or more companies, whether public or private.'37 He argues that whilst the formation 
contract concluded between the participants in the EEIG 'does not create a legal person independent of 
the partners to the EEIG… the EEIG can enter into contracts in its own name.'38  
 
II. Purposes 
 
The grouping may be used by its constituent members for a variety of ends. 
 
Firstly, members of a grouping may decide to use the structure for a specific on-going activity 
or for a one-off venture.  
 
Such a grouping may be used in a representative capacity on behalf of constituent members in 
order to submit and secure tenders for public contracts and subsequently it may be employed in a 
supervisory capacity to oversee the implementation of such works.39  
 
In the alternative, constituent members may opt to make use of the grouping in order to 
develop, manufacture, assemble and/or market goods. Car manufacturing and telecommunications are 
just two examples of industries that could benefit from such a structure. Arguably in place of a joint 
venture corporation (JVC) or in addition to one, the EEIG could act as a vehicle for collaboration 
between members based in the EU and the EEA for a specific project or for a continuous venture. The 
EEIG could be employed alongside a JVC or in lieu of one in order to develop a more efficient engine 
for cars or new technology for the telecommuncations sector.  
 
Secondly, the grouping may be used as an instrument for cross-border cooperation on specific 
projects or for long term purposes. 
 
This corporate form permits the pooling of resources by constituent members for the 
accumulation of common technical knowledge, 40  the carrying out of common research, the 
development of common know-how, novel or improved processes and products as well as the 
coordination of centalised administration of highly-specialised services.41 Groupings have for example 
been used in order to conduct research into high definition TVs and to provide common services to the 
legal profession.42 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Abell and Blin, 'EC Economic Interest Groupings come to life', 9. 
32 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 3. 
33 Engle, 'The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe', 377. 
34 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 11. 
35 Bill Millar, Economic interest grouping launched, The Scotsman 1 (11 October 1993) 
36 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 11. 
37 Engle, 'The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe', 377. 
38 Engle, 'The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe', 377. 
39 Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 118. 
40 Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 118. 
41 Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 118. 
42 Examples given by Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 118-119. 
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An EEIG may for example be established by professional entities (companies, partnerships or 
individuals) in different Member States on the proviso that the applicable professional rules do not 
limit or prohibit participation in such a grouping.43 A firm of solicitors in England may for example 
create an EEIG with one or more firms of lawyers throughout the EU to help further the respective 
operations of the different participating entities.  
 
Such entities may opt to use the grouping for the purpose of tendering for work, running 
support activities (call centres, out of hours services etc), carrying out joint research (of a legal and 
business nature) and promoting their respective businesses.  
 
An EEIG may even be used by participating law firms for litigation purposes, allowing law 
firms based and operating in different Member States to bring a class action on behalf of their 
respective clients. 
 
In the case of CMS, a network of European law firms formed in July 1999 and incorporated in 
Germany, the grouping of independent firms with representative offices in China and North Africa is 
able to deliver a ‘one-stop shop for clients who want that.’44  
 
What is more, this cross-border collaboration which employs ‘a single corporate identity and 
logo’45 has a competitive edge when pitching for work and securing client loyalty. Andrew Sheach, 
Head of UK Corporate for CMS, explains that this results from ‘the experience and local knowledge 
we have ... Our competitors just don’t have as many offices or strength in depth and size.’46 47 
 
Thirdly, the grouping may be used on a trial basis by constituent members in order to ascertain 
if they are able to commit to each other on a more permanent basis.48 Members may decide for 
example to form a grouping as a precursor to the creation of an SE. In the alternative members may be 
view the grouping as a forerunner to the realisation of a cross-border merger or as a pilot study before 
the execution of an acquisition. 
 
Part III – Benefits 
 
Introduced as part of the effort to establish a common market ‘in which conditions are the same as 
those on a national market’49 and in recognition of the fact that the different forms existing under 
national laws are not suitable for cooperation at the European level specifically due to the fact that 
these are creatures of national law, the EEIG represents a step on from a loose contract-based form of 
cooperation.50  
 
I. Uniformity of Treatment 
 
Introduced by means of a regulation,51 which governs, if not fully at least partially, most issues 
affecting the life of the grouping, the EEIG has been rightly described by the Commission as being 
primarily 'a creature of Community law.'52 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Saleem Sheikh, Business Law & Practice Transactions Guide 84 (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999). 
44 Andrew Sheach Head of UK Corporate for CMS quoted in The Lawyer, One-track mind 1, 20 (30 July 2012). 
45 The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20. 
46 Andrew Sheach Head of UK Corporate for CMS quoted in The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20. 
47 Andrew Sheach adds that in 2011 the grouping that uses a single corporate identity and logo secured over 50 percent of it 
pitches. (The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20) The Lawyer points out that the success rate for pitches in 2011 was 63 percent 
‘with an average of four CMS member firms featuring per pitch, representing on average six countries.’ (The Lawyer, 'One-
track mind',  20) 
48 Proposal 1973, 17. 
49 Proposal 1973, Preamble. 
50 Proposal 1973, Preamble. 
51 EEIG Regulation. 
52 Proposal 1973, 17. 
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The issues addressed by the EEIG Regulation include, but are not limited to, issues of 
formation, capacity in law, internal organisation, liability of members and the handling of profits. 
Issues not addressed by this Regulation are left to be dealt with by the members of the grouping (in 
their contract for formation of the grouping) and national law (referred to by the Regulation as internal 
law).  
 
By using a directly applicable regulation, the European legislature has ensured that each one of 
the Member States possess a uniform framework of rules governing EEIGs. Whilst each Member State 
has introduced its own national version of the EEIG53 the resulting national forms are still strongly 
rooted in a European regulation which is directly applicable in the different Member States. The result 
is that the EEIG 'has broadly the same legal structure across the EC'54 and is extended the same 
treatment by the various Member States.  
 
II. European Existence and Character 
 
The formation of the EEIG and its legal existence are rooted in European law even though reference is 
made to national laws in relation to certain matters affecting the EEIG.  
 
It is this endowment of legal capacity on the grouping by the EEIG Regulation which 
effectively transforms the EEIG into a supranational entity with recognised capacity under European 
law and the national laws of the various Member States. Professor Donald states in this regard that this 
form alongside the other supranational corporate forms available under EU law (such as the SE) 
effectively create 'an independent and neutral stratum upon which businesses can move from one 
Member State to another in a cost-effective manner.’55 
 
The supranational character of the EEIG is facilitative, it being 'much easier to convince a 
foreign company to enter into a cooperation agreement using an instrument that both parties know - it 
is national law for both parties - than asking a foreign partner to enter into, for instance, a Danish ApS 
(limited liability company) or a Danish A/S (joint-stock company), which differ in structure from the 
continental or British company model.'56 
  
III. Operational Versatility  
 
The hierarchy of rules applicable to groupings provides that groupings are governed not only by the 
substantive provisions of the EEIG Regulation but also by the terms of the agreement concluded 
between the constituent members of the grouping in circumstances where the Regulation explicitly 
provides so. 
 
The provisions of the EEIG Regulation provide a underlying framework for the operations of 
the grouping leaving many substantive questions to the members themselves to determine. This 
formatting ensures the injection of flexibility into the operations of the EEIG. It is this tensility that 
has been praised by business leaders alongside the lack of a minimum capital requirement and the 
European character of the EEIG.57 
 
The objective in this context is the empowerment of the founding members. This is achieved 
by allowing such members to devise a grouping with an anatomy and constitution which fits in with 
their needs and during its lifetime to permit these members to rework and to refine the configuration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Grodum, 'Denmark's EEIG gets general partnership treatment', 34. 
54 Grodum, 'Denmark's EEIG gets general partnership treatment', 34. 
55 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 10. 
56 Grodum, 'Denmark's EEIG gets general partnership treatment', 34. 
57 This praise was given by Dr Robb Wilmot CBE, Co-Chairman of European Silicon Structures and Mr Jean Pierson, the 
Executive Director of Airbus Industrie in their respective speeches delivered at an EEIG conference in Brussels on 18 April 
1989  (cited by Dine, 'The European Community's Company Law Directives - Changing the Balance of Power?', 44). 
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the grouping when required in response to changes in the business context, in the needs of the 
members and in the legal environment.58 
 
The discretion to make decisions regarding a number of key issues concerning the grouping is 
vested in constituent members. Such decisions include ones pertaining to the internal organisation of 
the grouping,59 the composition of the grouping in terms of membership (subject to the limits imposed 
by the EEIG Regulation),60 the name of the grouping, its duration (if any) and its objectives.61 
Moreover members have the power to determine whether or not weighted voting rights are extended to 
members.62  
By way of illustration, beyond the fact that the CMS network63 shares one corporate identity 
and logo64 it also has its own dedicated constitution, possesses an IT infrastructure shared by all 
members as well as common policies governing conflicts of interest.65 According to CMS executive 
director Matthew Gorman66 ‘the one-firm ethos at CMS goes through it like letters through a stick of 
rock. "[The commonalities are there in] the way we deal with clients through the practice groups and 
sector groups, training, business development and so on" …’  
Under the provisions of the EEIG Regulation, members of the grouping may decide when as 
well as if the grouping should be wound up.67 They also have the option collectively of putting an end 
to the winding-up of the grouping if they so choose.68 In the event that the grouping is being wound up 
by the court, the latter is permitted to suspend the making of an order requiring the winding-up if the 
affairs of the grouping can be and are put into order before the court has delivered a substantive 
ruling.69  
Matters agreed upon by the members are in turn encapsulated within the contract for 
formation.70 Agreement by the members is not obligatory as the EEIG Regulation lists certain default 
rules to accommodate for those circumstances where the members have not agreed upon certain 
issues.71  
IV. Financial Flexibility and Fluidity 
 
Beyond the fact that there is no minimum capital requirement for the EEIG, 72 the members of the 
grouping enjoy flexibility regarding its financing.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Proposal 1973, 18. 
59 Discussed further on in this paper. 
60 Discussed further on in this paper. 
61 EEIG Regulation, Art. 5. 
62 Though each member in the grouping has one vote (EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(1)), members are permitted to agree in the 
contract for formation to allocate more than one vote to certain members (EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(1)) on the proviso that no 
one member is allocated a majority of votes (EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(1)). 
63 Discussed in this paper. 
64 The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20. 
65 The Lawyer, United front 1, 26 (5 September 2011). 
66 The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20. 
67 EEIG Regulation, Art. 31(1). 
68 EEIG Regulation, Art. 32(1). 
69 EEIG Regulation, Art. 32(1). 
70 Agreement by the members is not obligatory as the EEIG Regulation lists certain default rules to accommodate for those 
circumstances where the members have not agreed upon certain issues. For example pursuant to Art. 17(3) of the EEIG 
Regulation, decisions that do not require unanimity and are not addressed by the formation contract are to be taken 
unanimously by the members of the grouping. 
71 For example pursuant to EEIG Regulation Art. 17(3) decisions that do not require unanimity and are not addressed by the 
formation contract are to be taken unanimously by the members of the grouping. 
72 Professor Dine citing Mr Jean Pierson Executive Director of Airbus Industrie who praised the EEIG as a form lacking a 
minimum capital requirement (Dine, 'The European Community's Company Law Directives - Changing the Balance of 
Power?', 44). 
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This state of affairs affords flexibility to the EEIG as a corporate structure, by permitting its 
constituent members not only to formulate a structure that is suited to their needs, but to continuously 
modify this structure as and when their needs evolve.73 This adaptability contributes to the organic 
nature of the grouping thereby creating a sustainable corporate structure. 
  
Members are free to agree on the structure that financing will take. They may decide that such 
financing may take the form of non-cash consideration as well as cash consideration.  
 
This latitude permits participation by entities that may not have the necessary financial 
resources to provide monetary consideration. Entities may be able to offer an alternative to cash 
consideration in the form of services, skills, technology, intellectual property rights and so forth. 74  
 
Contributions made by smaller entities, non-profit making organisations, universities and 
research centres for example may take the form of non-cash consideration through the rendering of 
research and development skills, consultancy services, intellectual property (such as patents and know-
how), materials and resources (premises, laboratories, electronic resources, personnel and so on). 
 
In addition to the flexibility available with regards to the structure of financing, participating 
members are free to agree amongst themselves – in the contract for the formation of the grouping - to 
limit their contributions75 and to alter the contributions made (by unanimous decision).76  
 
The members of the grouping are also permitted to modify their funding methods, as well as 
their rights and obligations by means of contract77 thus permitting the grouping to evolve in tandem 
with the needs of the members and the objectives of the grouping.  
 
In the case of the CMS network, for example, each of the participating members in the 
grouping contributes ‘a standard percentage of their revenue to CMS Legal Services, the EEIG that co-
ordinates the CMS organisation of independent member firms.’78  
 
V. Management Set-Up 
 
Subject to certain minimum requirements governing the internal organisation of the grouping imposed 
by the provisions of the EEIG Regulation, the manner in which the grouping is structured internally is 
is largely left up to the members themselves.79  
 
The bodies prescribed by the Regulation comprise a body of members acting collectively 
(collective body of members) which is permitted to make decisions implementing the objectives of the 
grouping as well as an organ consisting of one or more managers (the management body).80 
 
Notwithstanding the requirement that the grouping have a management body and a body of 
members acting collectively, the EEIG Regulation permits the members of the grouping to create 
further organs and to award these organs management powers.81  
 
In the case of the CMS network, constituent members have formulated and developed a 
bespoke governance structure for the grouping which is encapsulated within a document entitled the 
CMS agreement. According to this structure, unanimous consent is required from all members of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Proposal 1973, 18. 
74 Companies House, Guidance on European Economic Interest Groupings 1, 6 (2012) (Companies House 2012).  
75 EEIG Regulation, Art. 21(2). 
76 EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(2). 
77 Companies House 2012, 6. 
78 The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20. 
79 EEIG Regulation, Art. 16. 
80 EEIG Regulation, Art. 16. 
81 EEIG Regulation, Art. 16(1). 
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executive committee in relation to decisions affecting the CMS network.8283 This committee is 
responsible for defining strategy for the network and consists of the managing partner, the CMS 
executive chair, the CMS executive director as well as one further partner from each one of the 
participating members in the grouping.84  
 
VI. Management – Powers, Appointment and Dismissal 
 
Members of the grouping enjoy wide-reaching discretion in relation to the manner in which the 
management body operates and the mechanisms used to appoint and dismiss managers. Moreover they 
retain the power to call the managers to account and possess the right to ask to inspect the records and 
books of the grouping.85 
 
Members are free to define the powers of the managers on the management body,86 as well as 
the conditions for their appointment and dismissal. 87  They retain the discretion regarding the 
composition of the management organ.  
 
Whilst natural and legal persons are permitted to serve as managers of a grouping,88 a legal 
person is only permitted to serve as a manager of a grouping when national law allows for such an 
appointment and the legal person appoints one or more natural persons as their representatives. Such 
representatives are liable as if they themselves were managers of the grouping.89  
 
VII. Assignment, Admission, Death and Termination 
 
In order to add value to the projects undertaken under the auspices of the EEIG and to ensure the ready 
and continous injection of capital and ideas, free transferability and the freedom to admit new 
members are both important features. 
 
Assignment of participation in the grouping and the admission of new members into the 
grouping are both permitted under the EEIG Regulation on the proviso that the unanimous 
authorisation of the other members in the grouping is obtained.90  
 
To ensure continuity and certainty, the EEIG Regulation incorporates provisions that 
guarantee the longevity of the grouping and its activities. These provisions state that neither the death 
of a member nor the departure of a member will bring the grouping to an end.91  
 
Whilst death of a constituent member will terminate the membership of the deceased in the 
grouping, this death will not bring the grouping to an end.92 Unless a provision is made in the contract 
for formation or the remaining members unanimously agree on this, no person is permitted to replace 
the deceased member.93  
 
This provision prevents a situation where a new member is introduced into the grouping who 
is unknown to the remaining members. Where a prospective member is proposed in lieu of the 
deceased member, the remaining members have the choice to unanimously agree on the admission of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82The Lawyer, 'One-track mind', 20.  
83 Under the ‘CMS's governance structure it would take only one of its 10 member firms to vote against a deal with a 
potential US member to nix the deal.’ (The Lawyer, 'One-track mind',  20) 
84The Lawyer, 'One-track mind', 20. 
85 EEIG Regulation, Art. 18. 
86 EEIG Regulation, Art. 19(3). Typically such matters are addressed in the formation contract.  
87 EEIG Regulation, Art. 19(3). Typically such matters are addressed in the formation contract.  
88 EEIG Regulation, Arts 19(1) and 19(2) (respectively). 
89 EEIG Regulation, Art. 19(2). 
90 EEIG Regulation, Arts 22(1) and 26(1) (respectively).  
91 EEIG Regulation, Arts 28(1) and 30. 
92 EEIG Regulation, Art. 28(1).  
93 EEIG Regulation, Art. 28(2). 
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this new member. Such an admission may be made conditional upon the conclusion of a contract with 
the new member pertaining to their admission into the grouping.  
 
When a member stops belonging to a grouping, the grouping itself will continue to exist for 
the remaining members.94 This provision may however be displaced by the terms of the contract for 
formation.95 
 
VIII. Day-To-Day Running of the Grouping 
 
Whilst certain decisions that fundamentally affect the existence and operations of the grouping require 
a unanimous decision by the members,96 other issues affecting the grouping do not require such a 
decision.97  
 
Decisions that may be taken without a unanimous decision by the members will include 
budgetary decisions that do not affect the contributions of the members, the selection and recruitment 
of staff to administer the work of the grouping as well as the formulation and implementation of the 
business strategy for agreed works or projects of the grouping 
 
Day-to-day operations of the grouping will not typically require a unanimous decision taken 
by the members subject to the provisions contained in the formation contract. Once the members have 
agreed upon the objectives of the grouping, their implementation is a matter that may be left to one or 
more of the members or indeed to the management body of the grouping. 
 
This state of affairs facilitates the efficient running of the grouping allowing for dynamic 
decision-making, adjustment to economic conditions, optimisation of resources and a reduction in 
unnecessary waste.  
 
IX. Decision-Making Process 
 
Members are free to determine how certain decisions are taken on the proviso that no one member 
holds a majority of the votes.98  
 
Except where the provisions of the EEIG Regulation require that decisions are made by a 
unianimous vote of the members, the members are free to determine the conditions for a quorum and 
the requisite majority in accordance with which these decisions are made.99100  
 
If no provision is made in the contract on these matters then they will be determined by 
unanimous decisions reached by the members of the grouping.101 
 
X. Legal Capacity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 EEIG Regulation, Art. 30. 
95 As soon as a member stops belonging to a grouping, the manager or managers must advise the remaining members of this 
fact (EEIG Regulation, Art. 29) and must take steps to duly disclose and publicise the fact (EEIG Regulation, Art. 29). 
96 Pursuant to EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(2) the decisions that require unanimity include: Alteration to the objects and duration 
of the grouping; transfer of the official address of the grouping; changes to the number of votes allocated to each member; 
changes to the obligations of the members unless the formation contract says otherwise; changes to the contributions of the 
members to the grouping’s financing; and changes to the formation contract (unless otherwise provided for in the formation 
contract). 
97 EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(3). 
98 EEIG Regulation, Arts 16 and 17. 
99 EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(3). 
100 Pursuant to EEIG Regulation, Art. 17(3) unless otherwise provided for in the formation contract, decisions shall be taken 
unanimously by the members. 
101 EEIG Regulation, Art. 19(3). 
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The provisions of the EEIG Regulation permit the creation of a grouping by natural and legal persons 
in different Member States in order to establish and maintain links between them, whilst at the same 
time permitting these entities engaged in the grouping to retain their individual identity and legal 
independence.102 
To further the needs of the grouping and its constituent members (collectively and 
individually), the EEIG Regulation endows the grouping with legal capacity.103 In order to permit the 
grouping to achieve its objectives, provision is made in the EEIG Regulation for the grouping to be 
represented vis-à-vis third parties by an organ that is legally separate from its membership.104 The 
grouping will ʹ′have the capacity, in its own name, to have rights and obligations of all kinds.’105 As 
such, it will have the ability to contract and to execute other legal acts, as well as to sue and to be 
sued.106  
 
It is this legal capacity that is endowed on the EEIG that effectively distinguishes the EEIG 
from loose contract-based forms of collaboration.  
 
XI. Facility and Efficiency  
 
The EEIG is not only adaptable it is also governed by far less legal regulation than most national 
corporate forms in the individual Member States as well as other supranational corporate forms such 
as the SE. This in turn generates efficiency and facilitates operations. 
  
Formation, the acquisition of legal capacity, the right to create a secondary establishment and 
to transfer an official address are far easier for a grouping than they are for an SE or for most national 
corporate entities across the EU. These efficiencies coupled with the fact that there is no minimum 
capital requirement associated with the formation of the EEIG107 result in comparatively large savings 
on transactional costs as well as a reduction in the time expended.  
 
The formation of a grouping is a relative fast and cost-effective process when compared with 
the formation processes associated with the creation of certain national entities in the various 
jurisdictions in the EU and the other European corporate forms such as the SE. Whereas pre-1989, a 
whole network of joint ventures needed to be concluded in order to create a European wide network, 
post-1989 the EEIG effectively helps streamline affairs thereby facilitating cross-border 
collaborations.108  
 
In the case of the EEIG, once the contract for the formation of the grouping is drawn up109 by 
the members, it needs to be filed (at a designated registry110 in the Member State in which the 
grouping is to have its official address) and published (firstly in a designated national gazette111 and 
then in the Official Journal of the European Union).112  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Companies House 2012, 5. 
103 EEIG Regulation, Art. 1(2). It will be for each Member State to determine if a grouping registered at its registery (in 
accordance with EEIG Regulation, Art. 6) will have legal personality (EEIG Regulation, Art. 1(3)). Professor Werlauff states 
that even if this is so this would make no difference in relation to the liability of the obligations of the grouping as in relation 
to these obligations all the members of the grouping are liable on an unlimited scale and on a joint and several basis, though 
the ‘consequences of such liability’ are to be determined by national law. (Werlauff, EU - Company Law, 120) 
104 EEIG Regulation, Preamble states ‘[w]hereas, to enable a grouping to achieve its purpose, it should be endowed with legal 
capacity and provision should be made for it to be represented vis-à-vis third parties by an organ legally separate from its 
membership.’ 
105 EEIG Regulation, Art. 1(2). 
106 EEIG Regulation, Art. 1(2). 
107 Mr Jean Pierson executive director of Airbus Industrie praised the EEIG as a form lacking a minimum capital 
requirement. (Dine, 'The European Community's Company Law Directives - Changing the Balance of Power?', 44) 
108 Abell and Blin, 'EC Economic Interest Groupings come to life', 11. 
109 In line with the conditions set out in EEIG Regulation, Art. 5. 
110 EEIG Regulation, Art. 6.  
111 EEIG Regulation, Art. 8. 
112 EEIG Regulation, Art. 11. 
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Compared with contractual collaborations, the grouping acquires, as of the date of its 
registration, the capacity in its own name to have rights and obligations.113 This permits participating 
members the facility of transacting as the EEIG. In other words, rather than each member having to 
transact in its own right, the EEIG is able to transact as an entity on behalf of all participating 
members.  
 
In the event that a grouping creates an establishment in a Member State other than the one in 
which it has its official address, the grouping is required to register this establishment in the Member 
State in which it is situated114 by the straightforward act of filing the same documentation used for the 
purpose of primary registration together with an appropriate translation.115 
 
A grouping is permitted to transfer its official address within the EU by the provisions of the 
EEIG Regulation. In the event that such a transfer does not result in a change in the law applicable, the 
transfer is a fairly straightforward affair. What is more, such a transfer will not result in the winding-
up of the EEIG or in the creation of a new legal person. In contrast, national public companies are only 
generally allowed to transfer their registered office domestically and national public companies 
incorporated in Member States supporting the real seat theory cannot generally transfer their registered 
office to another Member State without winding-up and creating a new legal person. 
 
When the decision to transfer the official address of the grouping within the EU does not entail 
a change in the law applicable to the grouping, the decision to transfer may be taken in accordance 
with the conditions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping.116 The conditions for 
such a decision are effectively determined by the members themselves. The members may decide that 
such a transfer requires a simple majority vote (rather than a unanimous vote) or alternatively that the 
decision to transfer is at the discretion of the manager or managers without the need for a vote by the 
members. 
 
In comparison, a transfer in the EU resulting in a change of applicable law is far more heavily 
regulated. Such a move is subject to certain strict procedural steps.117 Firstly, a transfer proposal will 
need to be drawn-up, filed and published.118 Secondly, a unanimous decision will need to be taken by 
the members of the grouping. Such a decision may not be taken for a period of two months after 
publication of the proposal. If approved, the transfer takes effect on the date on which the grouping is 
registered at the registry for the new official address. That registration by the designated registry can 
only be made once evidence is furnished by the grouping showing that the proposal to transfer the 
official address has been published.119  
 
By comparison with the EEIG, the procedure associated with the transfer of a registered office 
by the SE requires compliance with far stricter conditions.120 
Before an SE may transfer its registered office, the management or administrative organ of the 
SE must compile and publish a transfer proposal and draw-up a report explaining and justifying the 
legal and economic aspects of the transfer as well as explaining the implications of such a transfer for 
the shareholders, creditors and employees of the SE.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 EEIG Regulation, Art. 1(2).  
114 EEIG Regulation, Art. 10. 
115 EEIG Regulation, Art. 10. 
116 EEIG Regulation, Art. 13.  
117 EEIG Regulation, Art 14. 
118 Publication per EEIG Regulation, Arts 7 and 8 are mandated for by EEIG Regulation, Art. 14. 
119 EEIG Regulation, Art. 14. 
120 EEIG Regulation, Art. 8 permits an SE to transfer its registered office from one Member State to another on the proviso 
that it complies with the conditions set out in Art. 8, paras 2-13. 
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The shareholders and creditors of the SE are permitted to examine both documents at least one 
month before the general meeting called upon to decide on the transfer. No decision to transfer may be 
taken for a period of two months after publication of the transfer proposal.  
Before the competent national authority issues a certificate attesting to completion of the acts 
and formalities to be accomplished before a transfer, the SE must satisfy it that liabilities arising prior 
to the publication of the transfer proposal, the interests of creditors and holders of other rights in 
respect of the SE (including those of public bodies) have been adequately protected in line with the 
provisions of national law in the Member State in which the SE has its registered office. 
The registration of the new registered office of the SE will only take place once the 
aforementioned certificate has been submitted and evidence has been given that the formalities 
required for registration in the country of the new registered office have been completed. 
As the transnational costs associated with creation of an EEIG are relatively low and the 
mobility of the EEIG involves minimal organisational and sunk costs, this supranational form is able 
to entice businesses and professionals to join forces with their counterparts in other Member States.121 
In addition, the availability of this corporate structure enhances the ability of the EU to attract inward 
investment from entities based outside the EU.  
 
XII. Ancillary Nature of the Grouping  
 
The grouping is intended to be used to facilitate or develop the economic activities of members122 
without the activities of the grouping being more than ancillary to the economic activities of 
constituent members. Furthermore, the EEIG is not intended at anytime to take over the activities of its 
constituent members.  
 
Since the members enter the grouping as going concerns and the grouping is merely auxiliary 
to the existing operations of the members, the creation of the EEIG neither affects the national 
operations of the constituent members nor undermines their autonomy as distinct and separate entities.  
 
This state of affairs allows participating members in the EEIG to preserve their individual 
identity, retain their own corporate culture, as well as to engage in business activities ‘under their own 
names, and be associated with particular member states'.123 As such the EEIG facilitates cross-border 
alliances without compromising or damaging the national character of the individual constituent 
members.124 Moreover, the establishment of a grouping will not typically undermine the corporate 
culture or identity of the participating members. For this reason, such an entity is unlikely to run the 
risk of being torn apart by the disparate cultures and identities of its members. 
 
Moreover, as the EEIG is not permitted to hold shares in its constituent members nor exercise 
management control over such members, the grouping effectively works for the members themselves 
and not vice versa.125 
 
XIII. The Membership of Non-European Entities in Groupings  
 
Since the EEIG is intended to promote cross-border cooperation between entities operating in different 
Member States, certain restrictions are imposed on admissibility to the grouping and the availability of 
such groupings to different entities, one such restriction concerns membership of groupings.126  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 24. 
122 EEIG Regulation, Art. 3. 
123 Conrad, 'European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws', 2164. 
124 Conrad, 'European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws', 2164. 
125 Companies House, 2012, 6. 
126 Carreau and Lee, 'Towards A European Company Law', 505 quoting from European Commission, Nineteenth General 
Report on the Activities of the European Communities 21, 112 (1986). 
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In this context, membership of a grouping is limited to legal persons formed under the law of a 
Member State with a registered or statutory office and central administration in the EU.127  
 
Notwithstanding this provision, the EEIG Regulation does permit national level derogation. 
According to the Regulation, in the event that the law of a specific Member State does not require an 
entity to have a registered or statutory office, it will suffice for an entity wishing to participate in a 
grouping to have its central administration in the EU.128 
 
Non-European entities looking to participate in a grouping will effectively have a number of 
options available to them.  
 
Firstly, they may establish a registered or statutory office and central administration in the EU. 
Secondly, they may establish a base of operations in a Member State whose law does not require 
entities to have either a registered or statutory office, on the proviso that this base of operations can be 
classed as the entity’s central administration. Thirdly, they may become involved in the grouping as 
associated members.129 This could be achieved through the use of underlying agreements.130 Finally, 
they could become involved with a grouping under the auspices of a larger cooperation such as a 
partnership or joint venture.131  
 
Referring to the first option mentioned above, Professors Donald and Chiffen both suggest that 
a non-European entity with a subsidiary established in the EU should be permitted to participate as a 
member in a grouping on the proviso that the subsidiary is independently incorporated and registered 
under the law of a Member State and its central administration is located in the Member State.132  
 
Professor Donald adds that the subsidiaries of non-European companies would be permitted to 
coordinate their activities using a grouping as a corporate vehicle so long as each subsidiary is 
incorporated in a distinct Member State. 133 In contrast, he contends that branches or offices of non-
European entities which are not formed under Member State law would not be permitted to become 
members of groupings.134 
 
XIV. Secondary Registration and Transfer of the Registered Office 
 
A grouping registered in one Member State is permitted to create one or more secondary 
establishments across the EU on the proviso that the establishment or establishments are registered in 
the Member State or States in which they are situated.135 The requisite registration process is relatively 
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128 EEIG Regulation, Art. 4(1) states ʹ′where, under the law of a Member State, a company, firm or other legal body is not 
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133 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 24. 
134 Donald, 'Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation', 16. 
135 EEIG Regulation, Art. 10. 
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simple, requiring only the filing of the documentation previously used for the purpose of the primary 
registration coupled with a translation. 
 
A grouping has the option of transferring its official address within the EU, either within the 
same Member State or between Member States. A transfer of the official address of the grouping that 
does not result in a change in the law applicable will only require compliance with the terms set out in 
the contract for the formation of the grouping, rather than any strict procedural rules imposed by the 
EEIG Regulation.136 With this in mind, the members participating in the grouping may decide to 
delegate such decisions to the management of the grouping.  
 
XV. Benefits Enjoyed by Individual Members 
 
Certain features associated with the EEIG make it attactive to the individual members participating in 
the grouping. Beyond the versatility associated with financing, the operational flexibility extended to 
groupings and the absence of a capital requirement for groupings, certain features associated with the 
EEIG make it attractive to the participating members. 
 
Each member has at least one vote subject to the terms of the contract for formation which 
may extend more than one vote to certain members so long as no one member holds a majority of the 
votes.137 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the day-to-day management of the grouping is entrusted to the 
manager or managers of the grouping, each member has the power to request information from the 
manager or managers of the grouping concerning, what the Regulation terms, the business of the 
grouping.138 The wording of this provision is drafted widely enough to technically encompass all 
forms of information relevant to the grouping and its operations.  
 
In addition to the right to request information about the business of the grouping, each member 
is entitled to inspect the books and business records of the grouping. 139  
 
Participation rights in the grouping are transferrable. Members accordingly enjoy the freedom 
to assign their participation in the grouping,140 in its entirety or in a partial form, either to another 
member or to a non-member. Such an assignment is possible with the unanimous approval of the other 
members.141 This feature permits a constituent member to sell its business and with it its participation 
rights in the grouping. Such rights are likely to have the effect of enhancing the value of the business 
to be sold. 
 
Alternatively a member may use participation rights in the grouping as security.142 Such an act 
may only be taken with the unanimous approval of the other members unless the contract for the 
formation of the grouping provides otherwise.143 Protection of the other members in the grouping is 
ensured by the fact that the holder of the security is not permitted to become a member of the grouping 
at any time by virtue of the security.144  
 
In the event that a member wishes to withdraw from the grouping for whatever reason, other 
than assignment of its rights, the value of its rights and obligations is determined by reference not to a 
value fixed in advance by the members (in the contract for formation for example) but rather by 
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reference to the real value of the assets and liabilities of the grouping as they stand at the time the 
member in question ceases to belong to the grouping.145 A member (withdrawing from the grouping) 
may accordingly strategically select the time when it wishes to withdraw from the said grouping, 
maximising its return and minimising the costs associated with such a withdrawal.  
 
Interestingly enough the Regulation does not apply this valuation rule to the situation when the 
member assigns his rights.146 Presumably this is due to the fact that there is an assumption that any 
assignment would be negotiated between the member assigning his membership in the grouping and 
the party buying the assigned interest in the grouping.147 
 
In order to limit the exposure of members and provide for transactional certainty, a limitation 
period of five years is prescribed when a member withdraws from a grouping, in connection with debts 
and liabilities arising out of the activities of the grouping before the member ceased being a 
member.148 A similar provision is made in relation to liquidations of groupings, when the limitation 
period of five years trammels the liability of members for debts and other liabilities arising out of the 
activities of the grouping.149 
 
Part IV – Drawbacks 
 
Whilst the EEIG offers clear perquisites to entities looking to engage in cross-border collaborations or 
formalise existing ones, certain drawbacks are associated with this set-up. 
 
I. Risk of Divergencies 
The legal framework for the grouping encapsulated within the EEIG Regulation requires 
supplementation by national law resulting in a stratified regulatory system for groupings. 
 
The legal amalgam governing groupings combines Union law on one hand and national law on 
the other. This hybrid system means that the application of the EEIG Regulation is not made 
particularly easy. 
 
One such divergency is the tax regime applicable to EEIGs. Whilst the regime applicable to 
groupings is touched upon in the Regulation the latter fails to 'provide much guidance on the tax 
treatment of profits made and losses suffered by an EEIG.'150  
 
Though Article 21(1) of the Regulation indicates that 'the profits resulting from an EEIG's 
activities are deemed to be profits of the members',151 the 'only real tax provision in the whole 
regulation'152 is Article 40 which indicates that 'profits or losses resulting from the activities of an 
EEIG are taxable only in the hands of its members.'153  This 'short' Article is supplemented by the 
preamble to the Regulation that indicates that 'otherwise national tax laws apply, particularly as 
regards the apportionment of profits, tax procedures and any obligations imposed by national tax 
law.'154   
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Since the Regulation does not address the question of taxation (other than direct income 
taxes), an EEIG may well be subjected to taxes in each of the states in which it operates including but 
not limited to value added taxes, indirect real estate taxes or specific local taxes.155  
 
The question arises as to whether or not members of the EEIG will be liable to income taxes on 
the profits generated by the EEIG in the country in which the head office of the EEIG is registered.156 
 
II. Unlimited Liaility 
Akin to the joint venture partnership, the participants in the EEIG do not enjoy limited liability. 157 On 
the whole, this state of affairs is likely to have a dampening effect, by curtailing participation in 
groupings, impeding its activities as a corporate form, reducing its popularity as an investment vehicle 
and adversely impacting on the economic stability and growth of the EU. 
 
As a concession to the lack of a capital requirement, members of the grouping bear unlimited 
joint and several liability for the debts and obligations of the grouping.158As such there is no limit on 
the financial liability of any of the members for the activities of the grouping and each member can 
individually be held liable for such activities.159  
 
This state of affairs is likely to compel potential members to opt for a corporate vehicle that 
will provide them with the benefit of limited liability over a grouping that exposes them to unlimited 
joint and several liability.  
 
The potential activities of the grouping may also be hindered by this feature for a number of 
reasons. Firstly members may only elect to get involved in projects that the members perceive as low 
risk projects. For this reason, members of the groupings may be averse to research and development 
projects due to the high sunk costs and inherent risks associated with such ventures.  
 
In addition, members may limit the range of activities of the grouping in the formation 
contract ensuring a tighter control over management, meaning that management will need to defer to 
the members when certain decisions arise in the daily operations of the grouping. Such an arrangement 
is likely to slow down the activities of the grouping and its ability to react to changes in market 
conditions thereby reducing its ability to compete effectively. 
 
This situation is not only likely to impede upon the activities of the grouping, but also to have 
a dampening effect on economic growth across the EU. 
 
It has been argued that whilst this facet is a disadvantage in terms of tort liability, it may 
represent an advantage for lenders and in turn for participating members. As far as lenders are 
concerned, each participating member in the grouping will be responsible for the debts of the 
grouping160 thereby spreading the risk for a loan amongst the participating members. In practical terms 
this may facilitate the financing of groupings in general and in particular collaborations under the aegis 
of the grouping that are of a high risk nature. When loaning funds to a grouping, lenders are safe in the 
knowledge that each member would be responsible for the debts of the grouping.161  
 
III. Inability to Raise Funding from the Public 
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A grouping is not permitted to invite investment from the public.162 As such the grouping as an entity 
can only rely on contributions or loans from its members. This state of affairs is likely to curtail the 
ability of the grouping to raise capital for ventures and will in turn adversely impact upon its potential 
for future growth.  
 
Whilst a grouping cannot be used by a banking consortium for an investment project involving 
investment by the public, it may arguably be used by a group of banks in the raising of syndicate loans 
to undertakings and public bodies on the proviso that the invitation for investment is not made to the 
public.163 
 
IV. Exposure to European Competition Law 
 
Groupings are not exempted from competition law and can fall foul of European and national 
competition law.  
 
The grouping ‘represents the framework surrounding the co-operation of the members. It does 
not provide them with a guarantee that their co-operation is lawful under the competition provisions of 
the EU … The choice of a legal form which is blessed by the EU does not represent a letter of release 
in relation to the cartel rules.’ 164  
 
The coordination of activities between the members may fall foul of Article 101 TFEU. 
Accordingly the members of the prospective grouping should give careful consideration to whether 
their cooperation may be contrary to this Article and if it is, they should consider whether such 
cooperation is exempted.165 
 
V. Usage is Limited in a Number of Respects 
Though it had been hoped that the EEIG would encourage cooperation between European entities, its 
use as a corporate form is limited in a number of respects by the provisions of the EEIG Regulation. 
This state of affairs has had the net effect of curtailing the functions that may be assigned to EEIGs.166  
 
In order to safeguard the interests of employees and creditors of the constituent members, as 
well as the autonomy of the participating members, the activities of the EEIG must not be more than 
ancillary to the economic activities of the constituent members and at no time may the grouping take 
over the activities of the constitutent members, by assuming a management role, holding shares in the 
undertaking of the member or members, or indeed replacing or absorbing the operations of a member 
or members.  
 
In order to safeguard the interests of employees and creditors of the constituent members, the 
financial position of the grouping is strictly regulated. For this reason, the grouping is not permitted to 
make loans or transfer property to either a director or a person connected to the director and may not 
become a member in any other grouping. 
 
Conclusion 
 
All in all from the point of view of the EU and the individual Member States, the EEIG obviously 
encourages cross-border cooperation due to the benefits that this form lends to entities engaged in 
cross-border activities.  
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The grouping is characterised by an ability to evolve gradually in line with the needs of 
constituent members and represents an economically efficient tool for businesses. 
 
To a certain degree, one could say that the benefits discussed above are eroded by the 
drawbacks associated with this structure. This state of affairs is likely to have a dampening effect, by 
curtailing participation in groupings, impeding its activities as a corporate form, reducing its 
popularity as an investment vehicle and adversely impacting on the economic stability and growth of 
the EU.  
 
After more than two decades since the introduction of the EEIG and bearing in mind the level 
of integration that has taken place in the EU since 1989, perhaps the time has come for a fresh look at 
the EEIG.167  
 
In order to enhance the use of the grouping as a structure for cross-border collaboration and to 
encourage inward investment in the EU, arguably the following reforms should be borne in mind. 
 
Conceivably the EEIG Regulation should be extended to create a more comprehensive 
supranational framework of rules addressing some of those issues that hitherto have been within the 
domain of the Member States, whilst retaining the provisions that extend powers to constituent 
members. This will ensure a higher degree of conformity limiting the divergencies that presently exist. 
 
Perhaps the participants in the EEIG should enjoy limited liability.168 The protection of 
creditors could be guaranteed instead by the imposition of a minimum capital requirement or in the 
alternative a structure should be created whereby one or more of the members participating in the 
EEIG bear unlimited liability whilst the others benefit from limited liability.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Enacted by the Council of Ministers on 25th July 1985 after more than a decade of discussion, the Regulation governing 
EEIGS became applicable from 1st July 1989 in the Member States (EEIG Regulation, Art. 43). 
168 Engle, 'The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe', 378. 
